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INTRODUCTION

I
n the wake of efforts to secure comprehensive reform of the United States health care system, attention has shifted toward reforms that are incremental in nature and that minimize direct government involvement. In this environment, it is reasonable to anticipate renewed interest in proposals to modify the tax subsidy for employment-related health insurance. 1 The preferential treatment given to employmentrelated health insurance has long been a source of interest to economists. 2 Critics have noted that it may encourage excessively generous coverage, and linking health coverage to employment may distort labor market outcomes such as participation, job choice, hiring, and mobility.
3 Certainly the tax subsidy is widely regarded as inequitable, because its incidence varies with marginal tax rates and with the level of excludable contributions.
These defects notwithstanding, there is also a growing consensus that the tax preference, by promoting employmentrelated group coverage, may help to encourage pooling across Research and Quality, Rockville, MD 20852 1 Under current law, employer contributions are exempt from unemployment insurance taxes, Social Security taxes (payroll and individual), and federal, state, and local income taxes Some individual contributions are also sheltered through cafeteria plans, and self-employed persons can deduct a portion of their qualifying contributions. Health insurance premiums (and most of the expenditures they cover) are also exempt from state and local sales taxes-although in some states premiums are taxed to fund high-risk pools. 2 The classic reference is Feldstein (1973) Other related studies include Taylor and Wilensky (1983) , Holmer (1984) , Pauly (1986 ), Manning et. al. (1987 , Chernick, Holmer, and Weinberg (1987), Feldman et. al. (1989) , Feldman and Dowd (1991) , Newhouse (1992) , and Phelps (1992) . 3 See, for instance, Pauly (1986) , Cooper and Monheit (1993) , Madrian (1994) , Holtz-Eakin (1994) , Monheit and Cooper (1994) , and Buchmueller (1995) families with different health risks. 4 In the absence of comprehensive reforms that would replace this institution for the pooling of risks, there is growing interest in reforms that would strengthen the employment-related system while removing some of the existing inefficiencies and inequities. Tax reform that would replace the current subsidy with a system of refundable credits appears very attractive when viewed from this perspective (Pauly et. al., 1991; Burman and Williams, 1994; Moeller, 1995) .
The formation of sound tax reform policy requires accurate estimates of the size and distribution of the existing subsidy. Estimates of revenue losses vary considerably, partly due to differences in scope and partly due to differences in methodology and data. One leading set of estimates is by researchers at the Congressional Budget Office (in CBO, 1994a; and Burman and Williams, 1994) . The CBO estimate of federal payroll and income tax revenue loss associated with current workers is $74 billion in 1994. Gruber and Poterba (1996a) criticize several features of the CBO approach, arguing that the tax loss associated with current workers is substantially higher at $91.2 billion in 1994 (inclusive of a small amount of state income tax loss).
5 Moreover, unlike CBO, Gruber and Poterba find large revenue gains from imposing caps on the amount of excludable contributions, even if the caps are set at relatively high levels.
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This paper presents new estimates of the revenue effects of capping or eliminating the tax subsidy for employmentrelated coverage. Our method incorporates many of the criticisms Gruber and Poterba raise regarding the choice of a core dataset and the need to consider the effective (rather than statutory) incidence of payroll and FICA taxes. Nevertheless, our estimates are substantially lower than theirs-and more in line with the CBO estimates. When we follow the most recent Joint Committee on Taxation methodology in treating non-excludable employer contributions as potentially itemizable medical expenses, our estimates are lower still. We also show that much of the revenue gain from capping excludable contributions would come from families with duplicative coverage. To the extent that capping the tax subsidy leads such families to change their coverage, static estimates of large revenue gains may prove overly optimistic.
THE MEDSIM MODEL
At the core of the MEDSIM microsimulation model are data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES).
7 NMES is a linked household, employer, and provider survey that contains person-level data on demographic characteristics, income, employment, health status, insurance coverage, medical expenditures, and insurance premiums (both employer and employee). The alternative to using NMES, or its successor, the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, as the core dataset for a microsimulation analysis is to perform statistical matches among multiple datasets. For instance, the CBO study uses NMES premium data that have been imputed to persons in the Current Population Survey 4 See, for instance, Monheit, Nichols, and Selden (1996), Selden (1999) , and Monheit and Selden (forthcoming) 5 The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) tax expenditure estimates are similar ($90 billion); however, the JCT estimates are for federal tax subsidies in fiscal year 1995 and include retiree benefits, so that any direct comparison with the CBO or G&P estimates would be misleading (Congressional Budget Office, 1994b, p 311) . Sheils and Hogan (1999) estimate the tax loss to be $111 billion in 1998, but this estimate also includes the tax subsidy for retiree benefits. 6 See also Gruber and Poterba (1996b) 7 For a more complete description of MEDSIM see Moeller et. al. (1996). (CPS). As Grubert and Poterba note, the CBO approach may not capture important covariation among premiums, employer contributions, and a range of socioeconomic characteristics.
Aging the Data
We age the NMES data forward to 1995 in two steps. First, we adjust the sample weights to capture overall growth of the population and distributional changes by age, sex, employment status, region, income, insurance coverage, and fee-forservice versus health maintenance organization coverage.
8 Reweighting the data helps capture several of the major trends underlying premium growth, such as the aging of the population and the shift to managed care. Reweighting alone results in an increase in (real) premiums of 7.4 percent, or nearly one-quarter of the 26 percent real premium increase between 1987 and 1995 as measured by the National Health Accounts (NHA). Second, we scale premiums by calibration factors so that the reweighted data match a variety of benchmarks. One calibration method is to scale premiums upwards until our reweighted estimate of total premiums equals the NHA estimate of private health insurance premiums (adjusted for differences between the NHA and NMES populations). The implied scaling factor is 1.566, yielding national premium estimates for the NMES population of $304 billion in 1995. This approach yields the lowest premium and tax estimates of the methods we consider, and thus we refer to this as our "lower-bound" calibration method.
An alternative method is to adjust premiums upward until the reweighted estimate of total premiums in NMES matches the growth rate of aggregate premiums in the NHA. This approach generates a much higher scaling factor of 1.902 (21.4 percent above our lower-bound estimates). Insofar as 1987 NMES premiums may be biased upward, we refer to this as our "upper-bound" calibration method. 10 Gruber and Poterba also calibrate NMES premiums to the aggregate NHA premium growth rate, but they do not reweight the sample before calibrating premiums. As a result, their scaling factor of 2.039 is substantially larger than even our upper-bound scaling factor.
11 By reweighting before calibrating, we capture the disproportionate growth in private coverage among persons (such as retirees) who are outside our population for analysis. Our approach also yields a larger population size and smaller premiums per capita, a difference that helps to explain why we estimate smaller revenue gains than G&P from the imposition of caps on excludable premium contributions.
Our third calibration method relies on benchmarks derived from employer surveys. We examine seven different employer surveys.
12 In every case, the resulting calibration factors fall within the upper and lower bounds obtained from our NHA calibrations. In particular, four of the employer estimates yield calibration fac-tors that are clustered together at the approximate midpoint between our upper and lower bounds, and we take the simple average of these as our "middle-case" calibration factor of 1.741. 13 The resulting premiums are 11.2 percent greater than our lower bound and 8.5 percent below our upper bound.
Population for Analysis
Our analysis focuses on tax filing units (TFUs) with employment-related coverage. We exclude TFUs with members who are currently retired. We include the employment-related premiums of individuals with self-employment income if their coverage is obtained from a non-self-employment job (but we exclude all other premiums of persons with self-employment income). The result is a population of 61.1 million persons in TFUs with tax-preferred employer contributions. This population is similar to that used by CBO and slightly larger than Gruber and Poterba's.
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RESULTS
Aggregate Tax Expenditure Estimates
To estimate the aggregate tax expenditure, we simulate removing the existing tax preference under the assumption that the employer's cost of hiring a workerincluding employer premium contributions and payroll taxes paid-remains constant.
15 Thus, the tax reform burden is shifted entirely to workers (rather than, say, affecting firm profits). Any reductions in employer premium contributions are assumed to be paid to workers as taxable wages rather than as other forms of taxsheltered compensation. All calculations use baseline marginal tax rates.
16 Table 1 presents our estimates of total revenue losses for 1995, by revenue source, under a range of assumptions. The first column of results in Table 1 presents our lower-bound, middle-case, and upper-bound estimates of the tax revenue loss computed under the assumption that individuals bear the full statutory burden of Social Security taxes. These estimates are most directly comparable to the CBO estimates, in the sense that they reflect similar assumptions about incidence. 17 Indeed, our middle-case estimate for federal revenue loss in column 1 is $73.7 billion-an amount that is essentially equal to the corresponding CBO estimate of $74 billion.
To compute the estimates in the second column, we follow Gruber and Poterba in using the Feldstein and Samwick (1992) effective marginal Social Security tax rates. 13 The four estimates are from (i) Cantor, Long, and Marquis (1995, aged from 1993/94 to 1995 using the NHA),
(ii) a KPMG survey of employers with over 200 workers, (iii) a Johnson and Higgins survey of employers with under 1000 employees, and (iv) an Applied Benefits Research survey of employers with between 20 and 100,000 workers In each case we attempted to construct NMES estimates that were as directly comparable to the provider survey estimates as possible. 14 Holding premiums constant across the two studies, our population implies a tax base that is approximately 3 to 4 percent larger than that implied by Gruber and Poterba's population Gruber and Poterba condition on age rather than retirement status, exclude persons with self-employment income, and exclude the employment-related premiums of TFUs in families with Medicaid recipients. 15 We define tax-preferred contributions to include employer contributions and other contributions (primarily union-related) for employment-related plans To allow for the fact that some employee contributions are excluded from taxation, we follow Gruber and Poterba in treating some individual contributions as tax preferred (using the numbers they provide). 16 Our approach therefore ignores the possibility that an increase in a given TFU's taxable income could cause the TFU to move to a higher tax bracket Given the flatness of the 1995 tax schedule, we believe that this is of little practical importance. For more on the MEDTAX tax simulation model used to generate tax estimates in this paper see Moeller (1994) . 17 Because there was virtually no increase in aggregate premiums between 1994 and 1995, our 1995 estimates should be roughly comparable to the CBO estimates for 1994 (absent, that is, differences in methodology).
As Feldstein and Samwick note, the effective incidence of Social Security taxes may, if viewed from a lifetime perspective, be less than the statutory incidence. This is because additional wages not only tend to increase Social Security taxes paid, but also the expected present discounted value of Social Security retirement benefits. Using our middle-case scenario, we estimate that total revenue loss based on the Feldstein-Samwick effective rates was $69.4 billion in 1995 (federal and state), or roughly $13 billion less than the comparable estimate if statutory Social Security tax rates are used. The upper-bound estimates presented in column 2 are most directly comparable with those presented by Gruber and Poterba, yet our total estimate of $75.4 billion is 17 percent below the corresponding Gruber and Poterba estimate. Part of this difference can be traced to the methods used to age premiums, while part can also be traced to differences in the way we edited reported NMES data.
The last column of Table 1 adjusts the estimates in the second column to reflect the likelihood that removing the tax exclusion for employment-related premiums would lead to an increase in itemizable medical expenses (for expenditures in excess of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income). To produce these estimates, we assume that TFUs would continue to hold the same coverage after removal of the tax subsidy. If TFUs were instead to reduce their coverage, the resulting increases in out-of-pocket spending might cause an even larger rise in itemized medical expenses. Factoring increased itemization into the analysis further reduces our middle-case tax expenditure estimate to More detailed comparisons of our methodology with that used in the CBO analysis, however, are complicated by the lack of published details regarding their methodology, as well as by the fact, noted earlier, that the core simulation files differ, so that the two approaches diverge from the very outset. National Tax Journal Vol. 53 no. 4 Part 1 (December 2000) pp. 877-888 $58.0 billion, or $11.4 billion less than the corresponding estimate if one ignores increased itemization. On balance, therefore, we interpret the findings in Table 1 as suggesting that the total tax expenditure for (non-retiree) health benefits is at or below the lower end of the distribution of published estimates.
Tax Revenue Gain from Capping Excludable Contributions
Rather than completely eliminating the tax subsidy for employment-related health insurance coverage, one option is to cap the amount of premium contributions that can be excluded. One relatively straightforward approach would employ TFU-level caps implemented through the existing tax system, with amounts above the cap treated as taxable income. Burman and Williams (1994) present CBO estimates of revenue gain from imposing the following caps on excludable contributions: $4,000 for TFUs filing jointly, $1,600 for single filers, and $3,400 for heads of households. They estimate that the federal revenue increase from imposing these caps would be $20.9 billion in 1994. Gruber and Poterba examine these same caps, but they find a much larger (federal and state) revenue gain of $33.0 billion in 1994. Gruber and Poterba also consider caps at twice this level, finding that even these much more generous caps would generate $8.6 billion in federal and state revenues.
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Table 2 presents our estimates of the revenue gain from imposing caps on the amount of employment-related premiums that can be excluded from taxable compensation. Our middle-case scenario for premium growth yields a statutory estimate of federal revenue gain from the CBO caps of $20.3 billion, an amount that is approximately equal to the Burman and Williams estimate. In contrast, our federal and state estimates based on effective Social Security rates are substantially below those of both CBO and Gruber and Poterba. Using the lower caps, we estimate revenue gain would be $19.4 billion (41 percent less than Gruber and Poterba's estimate). Using caps at twice this level, we estimate revenue gain would be only $3.8 billion (56 percent less than the corresponding Gruber and Poterba estimate). Indeed, our estimates are substantially below Gruber and Poterba's even when we apply our upper-bound calibration factors. The main explanation for this difference is that we use both reweighting and calibration to age NMES premiums, and as a result we make smaller increases in premiums at the TFU level. This in turn reduces the probability and extent by which a given TFU would exceed a given TFU-level cap.
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The last two columns of Table 2 show the extent to which endogenous increases in medical expense itemization may reduce the amount of tax revenues that would be raised by capping excludable premium contributions.
Tax Caps and Dual Coverage
It is important to consider the role played by dual coverage in the estimates of tax revenue gain presented above. 20 We estimate that in 1995 there were 7.6 million persons in TFUs in which at least one member had dual coverage (through his/ her spouse).
21 Such persons would be 18 See also Jack (1994) 19 The number of TFUs affected by caps varies less across methods than does the amount of revenue gain per TFU In our middle-case scenario, the lower caps would be binding for 58.3 percent of families with excludable contributions, whereas the higher caps would be binding for 11.6 percent of such families. The corresponding values for Gruber and Poterba are 62.2 percent and 14.4 percent of families, respectively. In the CBO study, the low caps would be binding for 51 percent of such families. 20 We thank Sonia Conly for comments leading to the inclusion of this sub-section 21 A spouse might have dual coverage to prevent against being uninsured in the event of unemployment More commonly, the two plans may offer different sets of benefits, different preferred providers, or additional coverage in the event policy maximums are exceeded on either plan. disproportionately affected by a cap on excludable premium contributions. Although they represented only 12.5 percent of the population in non-retiree TFUs with excludable contributions, persons in TFUs with duplicative coverage constituted 18.7 percent of persons affected by the low caps (and 28.1 percent of those affected by high caps). Moreover, TFUs with dual coverage contribute 38.6 percent and 33.5 percent of the revenue gain from the low and high caps, respectively.
22 Imposing caps on excludable contributions may cause such TFUs to drop their duplicative coverage. Because duplicative coverage tends to cross-subsidize unduplicated cover-age (Monheit, Nichols, and Selden, 1996) , any reduction in duplicative coverage would likely cause a rise in premiums on unduplicated coverage. Since the caps are less likely to be binding for unduplicated coverage, this would tend to generate offsetting increases in excluded contributions. At least a portion of the estimated revenue gains presented above might therefore prove illusory.
Incidence Analysis
In this sub-section we examine the distribution across families of the aggregate tax subsidies presented above. 23 As in any tax analysis, the true economic incidence of a reform may depend on general equilibrium changes in prices and incomes -effects that are beyond the scope of this analysis. Tax incidence may be especially difficult to determine in health insurance markets, given that reforms may affect both the amount of medical care consumed and the incentives for pooling across heterogeneous health risks.
Bearing these caveats in mind, Table 3 presents the increase in tax liability associated with (a) removing the subsidy and (b) imposing caps on excludable contributions, for families grouped by their adjusted gross incomes (AGI). 24 The burden estimates are presented in 1995 dollars and as percentages of AGI, with all estimates constructed using the FeldsteinSamwick effective Social Security rates. The top panel of Table 3 includes all families. The bottom panel includes only those families with excludable employment-related insurance contributions. In absolute terms, the overall subsidy clearly favors those with high incomes. Similarly, the burden of imposing tax caps would be greatest among those with high incomes. In contrast, the regressivity of the subsidy (and the progressivity of its reduction or elimination) is less pronounced when examined as a percentage of AGI. The bottom panel shows that among those families with employmentrelated coverage, the burden of reform would approximately be a constant percentage of AGI between $10,000 and $100,000.
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CONCLUSION
This paper employs the MEDSIM microsimulation model to compute new tax revenue estimates associated with the preferential tax treatment of employmentrelated coverage. We examine a range of methods for constructing estimates, exploring the impact of alternative methods for aging premiums, and comparing effective versus statutory Social Security tax rates. Our results that are based on statutory Social Security rates coincide closely with Congressional Budget Office estimates. However, as Gruber and Poterba note, those estimates overstate the tax expenditure insofar as they ignore the effect of higher taxable wages on future Social Security benefits. Switching to effective Social Security tax rates reduces our estimates of the tax expenditure by 17 percent. Because of the way we age the NMES data, our estimates using this approach are also substantially below those obtained by Gruber and Poterba. The magnitude of this difference between our results and theirs is especially large with respect to the revenue effect of imposing caps on the employment-related premiums that can be excluded from taxable income. When we allow for increased medical expense itemization and for reductions in duplicative coverage, our estimates of the tax expenditure are reduced even more.
Finally, the paper examines the distribution of additional tax burden that would be imposed on families by reducing or eliminating the tax subsidy on employment-related coverage. Insofar 23 Families are defined by health insurance and expenditure units consisting of persons who could typically be covered under a standard family insurance policy 24 To classify families we employ a full-AGI measure which includes the value of employer contributions Burden estimates were computed using the middle-case premium estimates and the Feldstein-Samwick effective Social Security rates. Very similar patterns arise using statutory Social Security rates. 25 Below $10,000, families obtain a positive net return on Social Security contributions and may face the negative marginal income tax rates associated with the earned income tax credit, so that treating employer contributions as taxable income would be preferred by such families Above $100,000, the income elasticity of premiums diminishes sharply, so that the subsidy as a percentage of income falls.
as higher-income families receive the largest absolute benefits from the current subsidy, they would also be most affected by its elimination or by the imposition of caps.
